

## Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMISSION BERLIN

AMEMBASSY PARIS

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 136795

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, ETRN, GW, GE, WB, UR

SUBJECT: APPROACH TO SOVIETS ON LUFTHANSA FLIGHTS TO  
WEST BERLIN

REF: A) BONN 8962; B) BERLIN 1121; C) BONN 9303

1. IN FURTHER BONN GROUP DISCUSSIONS OF SUBJECT, EMBASSY  
SHOULD BE GUIDED BY FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS WHICH ARE  
INTENDED TO ENCOMPASS PREVIOUS DEPARTMENTAL POSITIONS,  
RESULTS OF RECENT QUADRIPARTITE DINNER IN COPENHAGEN,  
AND RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS FROM  
BONN AND BERLIN (REFTELS).

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2. NATURE OF NEGOTIATIONS. WE CONTINUE, FOR REASONS

OUTLINED IN PARA 5, STATE 37008, TO OPPOSE GENERAL POLITICAL-LEVEL TALKS WITH SOVIETS ON BERLIN AIR MATTERS. OUR AGREEMENT IN COPENHAGEN TO BE HELPFUL TO THE FRG IN BRINGING ABOUT LUFTHANSA LANDINGS IN WEST BERLIN FOLLOWED AND WAS POSTULATED UPON THE PRESENTATION BY FRG FOREIGN MINISTER SCHEEL, WHO MADE CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD ALREADY ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE THE IDEA OF LUFTHANSA FLIGHTS TO TEGEL (PARA 2, COPENHAGEN 1354). THERE SHOULD BE NO NEED THEREFORE TO RENEGOTIATE THIS MATTER WITH THE SOVIETS IN BERLIN. AS WE SEE IT, ALL THAT THE THREE POWERS NEED DO IS CONFIRM THIS SOVIET AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE, AND SUGGEST THAT TECHNICAL TALKS BE UNDERTAKEN

IN THE BERLIN AIR SAFETY CENTER (BASC) TO WORK OUT THE PRACTICAL MEANS OF BRINGING LUFTHANSA FLIGHTS INTO THE BERLIN CONTROL ZONE (BCZ). RATHER THAN ATTEMPTING TO CONVEY A FOUR POWER MEETING IN BERLIN AT THE POLAD LEVEL, WHICH MIGHT ENCOURAGE THE SOVIETS TO EXPAND, PROLONG, AND POLITICIZE THE NATURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WE WOULD THINK IT PREFERABLE, ONCE AGREED TALKING POINTS HAD BEEN DEVELOPED AND CLEARED IN CAPITALS, SIMPLY TO SEND ONE WESTERN POLAD (PERHAPS THE CHAIRMAN FOR THE MONTH) TO EAST BERLIN FOR A BRIEF MEETING WITH HIS SOVIET COUNTERPART. IF THE SOVIETS AT THAT MEETING OR SHORTLY THEREAFTER CONFIRMED SOVIET AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO LET LUFTHANSA ENTER THE BERLIN CONTROL ZONE (BCZ), AN INITIAL, TECHNICAL-LEVEL QUADRIPARTITE MEETING COULD BE SCHEDULED IN BASC. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SOVIETS RESPOND NEGATIVELY TO THE WESTERN POLAD, THE FOUR WESTERN POWERS WOULD BE ENTIRELY FREE TO CONSIDER THEIR NEXT MOVE. (FYI. OUR OWN PREFERENCE UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE TO ASK THE FRG TO TALK TO THE SOVIETS AGAIN, RATHER THAN ENGAGE IN FOUR POWER AIR TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS OURSELVES IN BERLIN. END FYI)

3. CONTENT OF APPROACH TO SOVIETS. INITIAL POLAD PRESENTATION TO SOVIETS CAN, IN OUR JUDGMENT, BE FAIRLY BRIEF, BUT SHOULD INCLUDE THREE KEY POINTS: (A) THAT LUFTHANSA FLIGHTS TO TEGEL, WHICH SOVIETS ARE ACCEPTING, ARE ANALOGOUS TO VARIETY OF FLIGHTS TO SCHOENEFELD WHICH

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THREE POWERS HAVE TACITLY ACCEPTED OVER THE YEARS, (B) THAT SOVIET "ACCEPTANCE" PERTAINS ONLY TO ENTRY INTO BERLIN CONTROL ZONE AND NOT TO LANDINGS IN WESTERN SECTORS, OVER WHICH THREE POWERS RETAIN EXCLUSIVE CONTROL, AND (C) THAT BASIS FOR TECHNICAL TALKS IS NEED TO ARRANGE ENTRY MODALITIES IN INTEREST OF BERLIN AIR FLIGHT SAFETY.

4. TIMING OF DISCUSSION. DEPARTMENT AGREES THAT INITIAL

APPROACH TO SOVIETS COULD BE MADE FAIRLY SOON, AND THAT TECHNICAL-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS IN BASC COULD ALSO TAKE PLACE IN NEXT FEW MONTHS, BEFORE OR CONCURRENTLY WITH FRG-GDR AIR TALKS. IN GENERAL, WE SEE NO REASON FOR MORE THAN TWO OR THREE MEETINGS WITH SOVIETS IN BASC, SINCE THERE ARE REALLY NO DIFFICULT TECHNICAL OR SAFETY ISSUES WHICH NEED RESOLUTION. THE TALKS SHOULD BE COMPLETED BY EARLY FALL, UNLESS THE SOVIETS SEEK DELIBERATELY TO PROLONG THEM.

5. SUBJECT MATTER FOR NEGOTIATIONS. WE THINK TALKS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO QUESTION OF LUFTHANSA FLIGHTS TO

TEGEL UNDER THE TERMS OF THE FRG-SOVIET BILATERAL AIR AGREEMENT. WE HAVE NOTED BRAEUTIGAM'S POINT (REF A, PARA 4), BUT BELIEVE THAT DISTINCTION TO BE MADE IS THAT LUFTHANSA FLIGHTS IN QUESTION ARE INTO OR THROUGH USSR. TO RAISE RELATED ISSUES, SUCH AS NON-THREE POWER FLIGHTS TO WEST BERLIN, RISKS BROADENING THE NEGOTIATIONS INTO AREAS OF POTENTIAL DANGER TO WESTERN POSITIONS. THUS WE WOULD NOT WISH TO GIVE THE SOVIETS AN OPPORTUNITY, HERETOFORE DENIED THEM, TO COMMENT ON THE ACCEPTABILITY OR NON-ACCEPTABILITY OF SAS OR AUSTRIAN AIR SERVICE TO WEST BERLIN. THERE SEEMS TO US SOMEWHAT LESS DANGER IN RAISING ESSENTIALLY TECHNICAL OR SAFETY ISSUES SUCH AS THE LONG-DELAYED BARTCC-SCHOENEFELD COMMUNICATIONS LINK, PARTICULARLY IF THIS IS DONE AT THE BASC LEVEL IN CONNECTION WITH A DISCUSSION OF HAND-OVER PROCEDURES FOR LUFTHANSA FLIGHTS ENTERING THE BCZ. AN ORAL APPROACH ON THIS SUBJECT ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED BY USBER (PARA 3, REFTTEL B) WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE.

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6. PARTICIPATION IN BASC DISCUSSIONS. FOR PURPOSES OF MEETING WITH SOVIETS IN BASC, WE WOULD FAVOR HAVING REGULAR BASC PERSONNEL ASSISTED BY POLITICAL ADVISORS FROM EACH OF THE THREE WESTERN MISSIONS. ROGERS

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